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Rush: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
BERGER v. BERGER, 350 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Custody-Jurisdiction
In this case, the appellant filed for divorce in Virginia and North Carolina.
The Virginia court granted the divorce and awarded custody of the children to
the appellant, but it could not adjudicate property matters since it lacked jurisdiction over the appellee. The issue of the appellee's residency was raised in
North Carolina and was apparently decided adversely to the appellee. The appellee was in contempt of court for refusing to pay alimony and child support
ordered pendente lite in North Carolina, and both suits were pending when the
appellee filed for divorce in Kanawha County. The appellant moved to dismiss
on the grounds that there were other pending lawsuits, and the motion was
denied. The case was referred to a divorce commissioner who made findings to
which both parties object.
The issue was whether a case may be dismissed when there is a pending
proceeding in another jurisdiction between the same parties and concerning the
same subject matter.
The court held that West Virginia Code section 56-6-10 requires the court
to order a stay of the proceedings when it is apparent that a stay should be
had until the decision of some other action, and under this section a case may
be dismissed when the same parties are involved in a proceeding concerning the
same subject matter in another jurisdiction.
BICKLER v. BICKLER, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Custody- Unfitness of Parent
After separation from the appellee, the appellant and her daughter began
sharing living quarters with another man. In the divorce proceeding, the trial
court found that the appellant was the child's primary caretaker, but ruled that
the child's best interests required removing her from a home in which her mother
maintained an adulterous relationship. That relationship was the only evidence
of the appellant's unfitness.
The issue was whether there was a sufficient showing of unfitness to support
removing the child from the custody of the primary caretaker.
The court held that, in general, a finding of parental unfitness may not be
based solely on the ground of sexual misconduct, and there was no other evidence of unfitness that would justify removing the child from the custody of
the appellant as primary caretaker.
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BURGER v. BURGER, 345 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1986).
Attorneys Fees-Custody-Divorce
In this divorce proceeding, the court awarded custody of the parties' minor
children to the appellee as well as exclusive use of the marital home. The pro
se appellant was ordered to pay child support and the appellee's attorney's fees.
The record showed no consideration of the factors that the court is required
to consider in awarding custody and calculating child support and attorney's
fees. The appellant appealed, and citing undue financial burdens if required to
pay reprinting costs, he requested free transcripts of the evidentiary hearings.
The request was denied.
The issues were: (1) Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the
factors necessary in determining custody, child support, and attorney's fees; and
(2) whether an indigent is entitled to free transcripts in a civil case.
The court held: (1) The trial court's failure to make findings of fact concerning custody, child support, and attorney's fees was reversible error. The trial
court must determine custody under the primary caretaker guidelines and must
consider relevant factors such as the parental preferences of the children. In determining child support, the court must consider the factors listed in West Virginia
Code section 48-2-16. In determining attorney's fees, the court must consider the
factors found in syllabus point 4 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Pitrolo,
342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986); and (2) upon satisfactory proof of indigency, an indigent is entitled to free transcripts in a civil case.
CALDWELL v. CALDWELL, 350 S.E.2d 688 (W. Va. 1986).
Divorce-Property Settlement
The parties were married in 1970, and the appellant brought $25,000 into the
marriage which was used for the purchase of a house. That house was sold and
the proceeds used to buy a new home. The parties divorced after purchasing the
new home, and their property settlement provided that if the home were sold,
the proceeds would be divided equally between the parties. Before the house was
sold, the parties remarried. In a second divorce action, Judge Meredith ruled that
the previous property settlement had no effect since the contingency of the settlement (the sale of the house) never occurred. The judge awarded the appellant
the $25,000 she had brought into the first marriage and ordered that the remaining
proceeds from the sale of the house were to be divided between the parties. The
appellee's counsel never signed the divorce order, and the order was never entered.
Judge Meredith died, and the appellee requested that the new circuit judge reconsider the case. The new judge rescinded the order and directed that the proceeds from the sale of the house be divided equally.
The issues were: (1) Whether the new circuit judge erred in rescinding Judge
Meredith's divorce order; and (2) whether a property settlement in a second di-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss2/18

2

Rush: Domestic Relations
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 89

vorce action may alter a property settlement from a previous divorce decree.
The court held: (1) Since the divorce was interlocutory rather than final, the
circuit judge did not err in rescinding the order, even in the absence of any
showing of mistake, newly discovered evidence, or other factors listed in Rule
60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the property that
was divided in the first divorce became the separate property of the parties and
must be distributed as separate property in the second divorce, and the court
cannot alter the first divorce decree.
COTTRILL, In re CUSTODY OF, 346 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Custody-Relinquishment
Heidi's parents were divorced shortly after her birth, and her father was given
temporary custody. After her second birthday, she lived with her paternal grandparents and was supported solely by them. Her mother made no contact with
her until her fourth birthday, and afterward she made only an occasional visit.
Heidi and her grandparents moved to West Virginia in 1982. Her father died in
1984, and shortly afterward her mother was granted custody by an Ohio court.
Her mother moved for and was awarded custody in West Virginia despite the
court's finding that the child's welfare would be promoted by awarding custody
to the grandparents and that the child preferred to remain with her grandparents.
The court found that the mother was a fit parent and had not abandoned the
child.
The issue was whether the mother relinquished custody of the child so as to
support an award of custody to the grandparents.
The court held that the evidence indicated that although she did not abandon
the child, the mother did relinquish custody, and when a parent relinquishes custody and later demands the return of the child, the child will not be returned to
the parent unless the parent shows that a change in custody would materially
promote the welfare of the child.
FIRST NAT. BANK IN FAIRMONT v. PHILLIPS, 344 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va.
1985).
Equitable Adoption-Inheritance
Betty Shamblin, a first cousin to the deceased, claimed to have been equitably
adopted by the decedent's parents and was therefore next of kin as the sister of
the deceased. Four other first cousins also claimed the estate as next of kin.
The issue was whether an equitably adopted child may inherit from another
child of the adoptive parent.
The court held that under West Virginia Code section 48-4-11(b), an equitably
adopted child may inherit from other children of the adoptive parent if the eq-
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uitable adoption is established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
GODDARD v. GODDARD, 346 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1986).
Alimony-Divorce
In a divorce action, the trial court found that the wife was not entitled to
alimony because she was at fault in causing the separation. One of the causes
suggested by the court was the wife's hysterectomy, and some of the other possible
causes that were cited actually took place after the parties had separated. In its
opinion the court stated: " 'As to why the marriage deteriorated ...

guess. Perhaps it stems back to the hysterectomy.' "

we can only

.

The issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
wife's request for alimony.
The court held that the husband failed to demonstrate that his wife was
substantially responsible for the breakup of the marriage, and the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the wife's alimony based on its own speculations
of the cause of the breakup.
HARFORD v. HARFORD, 341 S.E.2d 847 (W. Va. 1986).
Divorce-PropertyRights
In this case, the appellant filed a complaint seeking divorce, and the appellee
filed a counterclaim requesting adjudication of property rights. The court granted
the divorce but did not adjudicate any property rights. The appellee's counsel
prepared a court order that not only granted the divorce but also granted the
appellee's request for relief in his counterclaim and stated that neither party owed
a duty of support to the other. The court signed and entered the order.
The issues were whether the final order was correctly entered, and whether
it could be reversed once entered.
The court held that a recital in a final order, although presumptively correct,
will be disregarded and modified if it is shown to be without support in the record.
JONES v. JONES, 345 S.E.2d 313 (W. Va. 1986).
Alimony-Attorney's Fees-Deposit-Divorce
This divorce action was referred to a special commissioner who required the
husband to pay a deposit to ensure payment of the commissioner's fees before
the commissioner would give further attention to the divorce proceedings. The
special commissioner's report showed that the husband's income from the year
prior to the divorce action was $8,160 while the wife's income that same year
was $8,320. The husband's net worth was at most $11,000 more than the wife's.
The special commissioner recommended a lump sum alimony award of $5,000
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and permanent alimony of $100 per month. The trial court made no specific
findings regarding the incomes, expenses, or net worth of the parties and awarded
the wife $1,500 per month alimony. In additon, the court ordered the husband
to pay the wife's attorney's fees with no discussion or evidence as to whether the
fees were reasonable.
The issues were: (1) Whether the commissioner's action in requiring a deposit
was constitutional, (2) whether the trial court's award of alimony was excessive,
and (3) whether the court properly assessed attorney's fees against the husband.
The court held: (1) Requiring a deposit before considering the divorce proceedings violates article III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution which
provides that "justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay"; (2)
the award was more than double the husband's actual yearly income and was
excessive without any explanation or rationale to justify the award; and (3) the
award of attorney's fees was improper without any determination of whether the
fees were reasonable in light of the work performed.
KIMBLE v. KIMBLE, 341 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1986).
Adoption-Child Support
The appellant requested the appellee's consent to the adoption of their daughter by the appellant and her present husband. The appellee executed formal consent to the adoption that provided that the appellee was released from his obligation
to pay child support. The adoption was never completed, and one year later the
appellee was served a petition for delinquent child support and a request to increase the amount of support.
The issue was whether a parent who consents to the adoption of his child
may be released from his obligation to pay child support even though the adoption
is never finalized.
The court held that a parent who consents to the adoption of his child may
be released from the obligation of child support if (1) the welfare of the child
would not be adversely affected by the release from either past or future support
obligation, (2) the adoption was not consumated due to inaction on the part of
the custodial parent, and (3) the failure to consummate the adoption has operated
to the detriment or disadvantage of the parent who gave consent to the adoption.
The court held that a recital in a final order, although presumptively correct,
will be disregarded and modified if it is shown to be without support in the record.
LOVEJOY v. HALSTEAD, 342 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Support-Modification
In 1975, the appellee pleaded guilty to fathering the appellant's illegitimate
child. He was ordered to pay child support of $45 per month based on his annual
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income of $14,000. In 1984, the appellant filed for an increase in child support,
alleging a change in circumstances. The appellee's annual income had increased
to $25,000, although his position at his place of employment had not changed.
No evidence was admitted concerning the increase in the child's needs, as the
court felt such evidence would not be relevant in determining a change in circumstances. The request for increased child support was denied on the grounds
that the appellant's occupation had not changed.
The issue was whether the increased needs of the child and the increased
income of the appellant are relevant factors in determining a modification of
child support.
The court held that "a material change in any circumstances relevant to the
support or amount of support" under West Virginia Code section 48-7-5 includes
material changes in the parent's income and the child's needs, and these factors
should be considered when determining the modification of child support.
McKINNEY v. McKINNEY, 337 S.E.2d 9 (W. Va. 1985).
Child Support
In a 1975 divorce decree, custody of the minor son was awarded to the appellee, and the appellant was ordered to pay support until the son reached the
age of emancipation. The appellee was awarded exclusive use of the marital home
until either she remarried or the son reached the age of emancipation. When the
son turned eighteen, the court ordered the appellant to continue paying child
support until the son turned twenty-one, extended the appellee's exclusive use of
the house until then, and ordered the appellant to continue to pay one-half of
the house mortgage payments.
The issue was whether the trial court had the authority to extend the appellant's child support payments and the appellee's exclusive use of the house
beyond the son's eighteenth birthday.
The court held that because a parent is not legally obligated to care for a
child beyond the age of emancipation, the court did not have the authority to
extend the child support payments beyond the son's eighteenth birthday, nor did
it have the authority to extend the appellee's use of the home since it was not
necessary to accommodate the rearing of minor children.
MARTIN v. MARTIN, 346 S.E.2d 61 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Support-Modification of Agreement
The parties in this case were divorced in 1971 when the legal age of majority
was twenty-one. The agreement provided that the appellee pay child support and
medical care until the children reached twenty-one or were otherwise emancipated.
In 1972, the age of majority was lowered to eighteen. When the children reached
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eighteen, the appellee filed for a modification of the agreement to terminate his
duty to pay support. The circuit court terminated the duty of support on the
grounds that the children had reached the statutory age of majority and that the
appellee was not required to support them beyond that age.
The issues were: (1) Whether the parent's duty of support extends beyond
the age of majority if the extension is part of a child support agreement, and
(2) whether the circuit court erred in modifying the support agreement on the
ground that there was no duty of support beyond the age of majority.
The court held: (1) Although a parent is not obligated to support a child
beyond the age of majority, he or she may contract in the child support agreement
to extend the support beyond that age; and (2) the court erred in modifying the
support agreement without determining its effect on the welfare of the children
since modification as such can be made only on a showing that the modification
is necessary for the child's welfare.
RALEY v. RALEY, 338 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1985).
Divorce-EquitableDistribution
During the parties' marriage, the husband had purchased stock through an
employee investment account in his name only. Contributions to the account were
matched by the employer. In her divorce complaint, the wife claimed one-half
of the stock. The husband retired after the complaint was filed and chose a plan
for distribution of the stock in which he relinquished all control of the stock to
the administrator of the account and received monthly payments scheduled to
deplete the account in ten years. These payments were classified as income to be
considered in determining the wife's award of alimony.
The issue was whether the investment account constituted marital property
subject to equitable distribution.
The court held that contributions to an investment account made during marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution in the same manner
as contributions to a savings account, and the right to claim such equitable relief
is not affected by the findings of fault in the divorce action itself.
RIDDLE v. MacQUEEN, No. 17068, slip op. (W. Va. Apr. 3, 1986).
Child Custody-Failureto Rule
In this case, the petitioner was awarded custody, child support, and alimony
in a 1980 divorce proceeding. Her former husband filed for a change of custody
in 1983, and the petitioner counterclaimed for accrued alimony payments. The
matter was submitted for a decision in January 1984, and when the court failed
to rule within a year, hearings to update the situation were held in January 1985.
After these hearings, the parties requested a ruling on the matters on numerous
occasions. No ruling was ever made.
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The issue was whether the delay in ruling justified a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondants to issue a decision.
The court held that the delay was so unreasonable that it rose to the level
of violating article III, section 17 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provides in part that "justice shall be administered without.. .delay." A trial court
or other inferior tribunal may be compelled to act in a case if it unreasonably
neglects or refuses to do so.
ROSE v. ROSE, 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985).
Child Custody- Voluntary Preference
The parties filed for divorce and agreed that their ten year old son could
choose the parent with whom he wanted to live. At first he chose to live with
his mother, but after his father told him his mother was leaving for another man,
the boy decided to stay with his father. At the hearing, the judged listened to
the son's testimony with only the court reporter present. Joint custody was awarded
to both parties with actual custody to the father, despite the court's finding that
the mother was the primary caretaker. The court awarded exclusive use of the
marital home to the father.
The issues were: (1) Whether the trial court erred in examining the boy outside
the presence of the parties and counsel, (2) whether the trial court erred in awarding custody to the parent who was not the primary caretaker, and (3) whether
the trial court erred in awarding exclusive use of the marital home to the father.
The court held: (1) The court may privately examine a child concerning his
preference of custody to reduce the trauma of having to choose between his
parents, and in this case the court made provisions for a transcript of the child's
examination to support the court's determination of custody; (2) the primary
caretaker presumption may be overcome by the voluntary preference of a child
who is sufficiently mature enough to express his preference, and the trial court
did not err in awarding custody based on that preference; and (3) the trial court
did not err in awarding exclusive use of the marital home to the father as the
custodial parent.
ROZAS v. ROZAS, 342 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Custody-Expert Opinion
In a child custody hearing, the court concluded that the mother had physically
abused her child and posed a significant risk to the child's health and welfare.
The court ordered a psychological examination of the mother, but the report was
not admitted into evidence, and the father was not permitted to inspect the report
nor cross-examine the report's preparer. While the court made no finding as to
the mother's fitness, it held that there was no evidence that the father was an
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unfit parent. Custody of the child was awarded to the mother on the condition
that the child and the mother live with the mother's parents.
The issues were: (1) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the
father to cross-examine the report's preparer, (2) whether the court erred in refusing to permit inspection of the report, and (3) whether the court erred in
awarding custody to the mother and her parents without a specific finding of the
mother's fitness.
The court held: (1) The trial court did not err in refusing to allow the father
to cross-examine the report's preparer since there is no right to cross-examination
when an expert's report is not admitted as evidence; (2) the trial court erred in
refusing to allow inspection of the report since the father retained discovery rights
to a court-appointed expert's report, even if the report was not admitted into the
record; and (3) the court erred in awarding custody without a specific finding of
the mother's fitness. Absent a showing of unfitness, the father's right to custody
outweighs that of the grandparents, and the court cannot award custody to the
mother and the grandparents over the father's right to custody if the mother is
unfit.
STATE ex rel. BRITTON v. WORKMAN, 346 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1986).
Child Support-Contempt-Sanctions
The relator was delinquent in paying child support in the amount of over
$12,000. He was found in contempt and placed in a work-release program under
which he was to pay $300 per month current support and $200 per month toward
the arrearage until it was paid. Under the work-release program, the relator was
to be released from jail only to go to work each day. In his habeas corpus appeal,
the relator claimed inability to purge the contempt, which was therefore criminal
contempt and illegal without a jury trial.
The issues were: (1) Whether the contempt was criminal, (2) whether incarceration is proper in a civil contempt proceeding in which the defendant is unable
to pay, and (3) whether the relator could be held under the work-release program
until the child support was paid.
The court held: (1) (Citing State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 276 S.E.2d 812
(W. Va. 1981))
Where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to
compel compliance with a court order by the contemner so as to benefit the party
bringing the contempt action by enforcing, protecting, or assuring the right of
the party under the order, the contempt is civil.
The appropriate sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that incarcerates
a contemner for an indefinite term and that also specifies a reasonable manner
in which the contempt may be purged.
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The contempt was civil rather than criminal since the relator was incarcerated to
compel compliance with the child support order for the benefit of his child and
since he had the opportunity to purge the contempt by paying the child support;
(2) West Virginia Code section 48-2-22(c) precludes incarceration of a defendant
who is unable to pay. However, the court was unable to determine whether the
relator had the ability to pay the child support since the record was not before
the court; and (3) under West Virginia Code section 48-2-22, the time period for
confinement for contempt is limited to six months. The schedule for payment of
child support set by the trial court would require over five years for the relator
to fulfill his obligations. The relator cannot be held for the entire five year period
necessary for payment since the sentence is limited to six months.
PatriciaL. Rush

See also,
CAv.

PROCEDURM:
Moore v. Hall, 341 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1986).
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